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A Bayesian Game for Exploring Political and
Bureaucratic Corruption
Abstract
This paper deals with the relationship between bureaucratic cor-
ruption and political corruption from the perspective of the industrial
structure of a country. In so doing, we discuss whether political cor-
ruption and bureaucratic corruption can coexist. For this purpose, a
suitable theoretical game model with incomplete information is con-
structed and solved. We demonstrate that the size of capital of a
specific firm influences the decision of such firm to bribe the bureau-
crat or lobby the government. Therefore, political and bureaucratic
corruption are substitutes at the level of the firm because they depend
on the capital of the firm, but they can coexist at a macro level. Some
numerical experiments validate the theoretical model.
Keywords: Game with incomplete information, bureaucratic corruption, po-
litical corruption, industrial organization.
1 Introduction
Corruption is not a straightforward, and must be interpreted in context. In
particular, political corruption is fundamentally different from bureaucratic
corruption. The latter refers to the payment of bribes for services in regards
to the implementation of regulations, while political corruption refers to in-
fluencing the formulation of laws and other public policies through illicit or
non transparent means to achieve an economic advantage (see e.g.: Hellman
and Kaufmann, 2001).
Some authors (see e.g. Damania et al. 2004, Harstad and Svensonn 2011,
Campos ad Giovannoni 2007) call ”lobbying” all actions aimed ar influenc-
ing policy-makers, and use ”corruption” for bureaucratic corruption only.
Strictly speaking, this definition is not completely satisfactory since it fails
to distinguish between legal and illegal means of influencing the formulation
of public policies, regulations and rules. In fact, considering only lobbying
and bureaucratic corruption would be correct in some political systems, no-
tably the US, where the provision of monetary payments to policy–makers
is perfectly legal (lobbying) but it is not correct for other political systems
1
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where the same exact payments are illegal and considered as a for of corrup-
tion (political corruption). From this point of view, a broader definition of
corruption encompassing all illegal procedures seems more useful. Indeed,
according to Kaufmann (2009), corruption should include all actions lead-
ing to a bending of the rules, even when strictly speaking they are legal.
More specifically, political corruption can be distinguished from other forms
of political influence, like lobbying, based on the procedures through which
private interests interact with the political sphere. Political corruption takes
place ensuring private gains to politicians through informal, non-transparent
and obviously preferential channels of access.
In our paper, we analyze the relationship between political corruption and
bureaucratic corruption in order to understand whether they can coexist at
an aggregated level.
For this purpose, we construct and develop a theoretical game with incom-
plete information. This approach is based on two scientific premises: first,
corruption can be found only in the case of interacting economic agents;
second, since illegal activities may be detected by controllers, corruption is
a risky activity. We refer readers to Moulin (1986) and Mesterton-Gibbons
(2000) for a survey of game theory with applications in the economic and
social sciences.
The game is played by three classes of agents: politicians, bureaucrats and
firms. Firms have the possibility to comply with regulations or not. As
in other studies, we assume that politicians and bureaucrats are open to
bribery (see e.g. Chander and Wilde 1992, Hindricks et al. 1999 and Sanyal
et al. 2000). Moreover, the game is played in a stepwise form till a given
time threshold. We address the reader to Section 2 for a detailed description
of the game, and here we limit ourselves to pointing out that randomness is
identified by the presence of a positive probability to be detected in a corrupt
transaction by the authorities. Political corruption may appear only at the
beginning of the game – i.e.: time t = 0 – when firms have the opportunity
to bribe the politicians to obtain changes in a rule that remains in force for
the entire period. Moreover, a term capturing the effectiveness of political
corruption is suitably introduced. In so doing, we include in the theoretical
model the evidence that modifying norms and laws is a reversible activity,
the reversibility being linked to the political and social situation and to the
life cycle of the administration in charge. Hence, political corruption may
have a weak effect.
The theoretical results obtained by solving the game are validated through
extensive simulations. For this purpose, we assume that a Gamma distribu-
tion describes the population of firms by capital level. As a consequence, it
is possible to build several scenarios – by appropriately selecting the Gamma
parameters – and comparing them.
Our paper is not the first that deals with corruption from a game the-
ory perspective, and some contributions are particularly worth to mention-
2
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ing. Macrae (1982) develops a theoretical game model for corruption in
underdeveloped countries. Pasetta (1999) views bribes as externalities in a
divide-money game. Celentani and Ganuza (2002) introduce a game model
to examine how the inner structure of corruption – conceived as of corrupt
individuals and groups – affects corruption control. Cerqueti and Coppier
(2009, 2011) discuss the role of corruption in economic growth by considering
games in static and dynamic frameworks. Ethnic fractionalization and its
relationship with corruption are the main themes of Cerqueti et al. (2012)
and Cerqueti and Coppier (2014a). The first paper by Cerqueti differs from
the second and from the present one, being based on a game with complete
information. Cerqueti and Coppier (2013) discuss the role of incentives for
tax evasion controllers open to bribery, and study the problem through a
Bayesian game. Majundar and Han Yoo (2012) explore the phenomenon of
influence peddling by developing first a one-stage game, and then a repeated
one. Cerqueti and Coppier (2014b) presents a game where environmental
protection represents a tool for morally persuading firms to be compliant
with the regulation.
None of the papers cited above examines the relationship between bureau-
cratic corruption and political corruption. In this respect, we are particu-
larly close to Harstad and Svensson (2011), who face the problem of selection
between lobbying and bureaucratic corruption through a game theoretical
model. However, the present paper is radically different from Harstad and
Svensson (2011) for some relevant reasons: first – as already stated above –
we refer to a broad concept of political corruption, which is an illegal activity.
Differently, the quoted paper considers lobbying as a legal procedure to in-
fluence the regulation; second, we include explicitly the industrial structure
of the country among the ingredients of the model. In this respect, firm size
proxies the country’s industrial structure rather than the level of develop-
ment of the country itself. In so doing, the role of the capital distribution of
the firms in driving towards political or bureaucratic corruption is explored;
third, we introduce a term – denoted as α, see below – which measures the
persistency of the effects of the lobbying activity. In particular, we model
the evidence that political corruption might be more or less effective on the
basis of how and if politicians intend to implement the promised policies.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first game model dealing with the
problem of the coexistence of these two types of corruptions and including
also the industrial structure of the considered country. However, we are in
the mainstream when dealing with agents who are profit maximizers and
whose relative bargaining powers are fully considered (see e.g. Anthropelos
et al., 2014).
The above-described generalization of the Harstad and Svensson (2011)’s
framework leads to a rather complicated setting. However, such complexity
is rewarded by interesting outcomes. We here demonstrate that the rela-
tionship between political and bureaucratic corruption is linked with the
3
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specific industrial structure of a country. Moreover, we also find that a suffi-
ciently high capital level of the firm is a necessary condition for engaging in
political corruption. But we also find that such a condition is not sufficient
for making it economically profitable. This outcome is due to the realistic
assumption that the politicians cannot grant the permanent and effective
changing of the rule (see the above mentioned parameter α in the model).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we describe the timing of the game and provide the main results.
Section 4 contains some numerical experiments validating the theoretical
results. Section 5 is devoted to the economic interpretation of the outcomes
of the paper. The last section offers some conclusive remarks.
2 Theoretical model
Consider an economy composed of three players: high level public official
(politician), low level public official (bureaucrat) and the firm. The game is
played for the first time at date t = 0, and then repeated each time until a
final date T > 0.
The payoff vectors will be indicated with a triple
pi = (pi(F ), pi(B), pi(P )), ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . , T, (1)
where pi(F ), pi(B) and pi(P ) represent the payoffs of the firm, the bureaucrat
and the politician, respectively.
We assume that, even if the firm is required to comply with the laws and
regulations, it may decide not to do it. In the non-compliant case, it may
seek to avoid the application of the law time-by-time by bribing a bureaucrat
(bureaucratic corruption) or it can seek to change the existing legislation at
time t = 0 in its favor by bribing a politician (political corruption). In prac-
tice, politicians are assumed to emanate laws only at time t = 0, and such
laws stand in force for the whole period [0, T ]. The terminal time T > 0
may be viewed as the lifetime – in electoral terms – of the politician. After
T , elections take place, and the changing of the government leads to a new
framework for writing rules and laws.
One can think for example, to the case of polluting firms whose emissions
are regulated through environmental laws which fix a pollution tax. For the
sake of simplicity, we will refer hereafter to this paradigmatic case.
In order to regulate pollution emissions, two levels of public official are neces-
sary: high-level public officials, i.e. politicians, who formulate environmental
policies, and low-level public officials, i.e. bureaucrats, who are responsible
for implementing at each time these environmental policies (e.g. through
inspections). Notice that bureaucratic and political corruption are mutually
exclusive (see item (iv) at the end of this section). This means that a given
firm cannot decide to implement political corruption at time t = 0 and also
4
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bureaucratic corruption in the period [0, T ]. In fact, the targets of the two
types of corruptions are identical, i.e. to remove the pollution tax.
We assume that the government cannot directly observe the level of pollu-
tion emitted by the firm and therefore, employs environmental inspectors
(bureaucrats) to check pollution level in order to counter environmental
evasion or prevent pollution. We consider the relationship between political
corruption, bureaucratic corruption and industrial organization. There is
an important difference between the two forms of non-compliant behavior
by the firm: bureaucratic corruption bends the rules only temporary (for
one period in our model) because firms deal with different bureaucrats over
time (in each period), while political corruption implies a legislative change
and, therefore, alters the status quo for a longer period. In fact, even if
political corruption may take place only at time t = 0, in our model we
consider that the effects of the political corruption, i.e. the change of the
rule, refer to a period which goes from t = 0 to t = T . In both cases, the
effects of non-compliant behaviors apply only to non-compliant firms. More
precisely, changing the rules helps only the firms bribing the politicians, and
free-riding is not allowed.
It should be noted that the effects of political corruption are strongly
linked to several politically-bas d factors, such as the stability of the admin-
istration or the outcomes of ”midterm” elections. In this respect, following
Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2008), we assume that the politicians remain
in office and are able to implement the promised policy till time t = T .
However, a change in the political situation may cause a weakening of the
legislative interventions produced by lobbying activity. To capture this as-
pect, we introduce a parameter α ∈ [0, 1], which may be viewed as a proxy
of lobbying effectiveness. More specifically, as the value of α increases, the
alteration of the status quo in time and size is more evident. The corner
cases are α = 0 – which means ”no effects caused by political corruption ”
– and α = 1 – which describes a permanent effect.
Each firm has to deal with some regulations that hamper its activity (e.g.
environmental regulation). Unlike Harstad and Svensonn (2011), we con-
sider firms heterogeneous with respect to capital level. This allows us to
carry out an analysis of the industrial structure of the country. Thus, the
production of the j-th firm is:
yj = g(kj) = rkj (2)
where r is a productivity parameter and kj is the specific capital level of the
j-th firm.
If the firm complies with regulation, it has to pay a proportional cost c on
production kj .
The j-th firm might have an economic incentive to corrupt the politicians in
order to change the regulation. For simplicity, we assume that in this case
– i.e. α = 1 – the new law provides no emission cost for the firm. Thus, the
5
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firm must, on the basis of its expected costs of compliance with the rules
ckj , evaluate its economic incentive with respect to political corruption.
We assume that the politician wants a bribe P at time t = 0 for changing
the current regulation. Changing the rules benefits all firms which, in equi-
librium, find it worthwhile to corrupt the politician. Hence, they may share
the cost of political corruption. But, as we said, the firms are heterogeneous
with respect to their capital level kj . Therefore, the politician asks for a
bribe pj which is the Nash solution of a bargaining game between the j-th
firm and the politician. As we will see, we assume, without loss of general-
ity, that the bargaining strength of the firm is equal to β and it is the same
versus both politicians and bureaucrats.
In order to describe the heterogeneity of the capital, we consider the cu-
mulative probability function which defines the distribution of individual
capital level F (kj), where j is the specific firm. The density function of F
is denoted as f . The shape of the function f provides good information on
the general level of firm capital, used as a proxy for industrial structure. In
particular, the symmetry properties of the function f provide information
on the distribution of the firms in terms of high or low capital level1.
Given the heterogeneity of firms, their behavior vary with their capital level
kj . We assume that the political and bureaucratic corruption can be dis-
covered with an exogenous probability q. If the political corruption is not
discovered, the benefit gained by the j-th firm is represented by the lower
emission cost for the firm (1 − α)ckj for T + 1 times. If political or bu-
reaucratic corruption is discovered, then the firm is fined for an amount m,
while politicians and bureaucrats must pay a constant fine λP and λB, re-
spectively.
Thus, the necessary condition for the j-th firm for participate to political
corruption is that the expected payoff of engaging in political corruption
is greater than the expected cost of political corruption. Since political
corruption may appear only at the beginning of the period, as already pre-
announced above, then the payoff of the political corruption is considered
at time t = 0.
1Since f is a centered symmetric function, then the Country has an average level of
capital, and the number of large firms balances the number of little firms. The case of f
asymmetric to the left can be associated to a Country where most firms are little, while
f is asymmetric to the right in Countries where most firms are large. Therefore, for our
analysis to be complete, we need to provide a random law for the capital level which may
describe the generality of the cases, depending on the value of some parameters. This goal
can be achieved by adopting a probability law commonly used in a rather mathematical
context, namely: the Gamma distribution. In fact, of all the distribution functions of
random variables with support in [0,∞], the Gamma law seems to be the more appropriate
choice for F , since it has features that make it suitable for modeling the different capital
level of the firms, belonging to a given Country, i.e. the industrial structure.
6
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The payoff at time t = 0 of the case of political corruption is given by:
piP =

(rkj − (1− α)ckj − pj ;wB;wP + P ), with probability 1− q;
(rkj − ckj −m;wB;wP − λP ), with probability q,
(3)
where wB and wP are the salaries earned by the bureaucrat and the politi-
cian, respectively.
Therefore, the necessary condition for the firm to engage in political
corruption is:
q(rkj − ckj −m) + (1− q)(rkj − pj − (1− α)ckj) ≥ 0, (4)
Inequality (4) is equivalent to
kj ≥ qm+ pj(1− q)
r − c[q + (1− α)(1− q)] . (5)
We take condition (5) as the requirement to be satisfied by the capital of
the j-th firm to let the implementation of political corruption be possible.
Politicians might decide not to change the rule. In this case, the firm must
decide whether to comply or to bribe the bureaucrat.
Analogously, in the case in which the j-th firm does not find it worthwhile
to engage in political corruption, the firm must decide every year whether to
comply with environmental regulations or not. In the latter case, the non-
compliant j-th firm is checked and it can corrupt the bureaucrat through
a bribe bj , for each t, in order for the non-compliance not to be reported.
The value of the bribe is the result of a bargaining process between firm and
bureaucrat that takes place in each period.
To meet economic reasonability, the time evolution of the game is obeys
some simple rules. We list them here as follows:
(i) if the j-th firm complies at time t = 0, then it complies at time t =
1, . . . , T ;
(ii) if the j-th firm bends the rule and there is an agreement on a bribe
bNBj at time t = 0, then there is bureaucratic corruption with bribe
bNBj at time t = 1, . . . , T ;
(iii) if the j-th firm bends the rule and refuses the bribe at time t = 0, then
there is not agreement on a bribe at time t = 1, . . . , T ;
(iv) if the j-th firm implements political corruption, then it does not have
the possibility to comply or bend the rule at time t = 1, . . . , T .
7
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3 The game: description and solution
Given the framework described above, we can formalize the economic prob-
lem into a two four-period game with incomplete information.
For a clear exposition, we present the game is a stepwise form. The
stepwise scheme of the game is the following:
3.1 Time t = 0
First stage
The j-th firm must decide if comply with regulation or not. If the j-th firm
will find it worthwhile to comply, the payoff vector is:
pi1 = (rkj − ckj ;wB;wP ). (6)
If the j-th firm decides to not comply, the game continue at Second stage.
Second stage
Two cases must be distinguished: if condition (5) is not true, then the
firm may implement only bureaucratic corruption; otherwise, the firm may
consider also political corruption.
Case I: condition (5) holds
The j-th firm must decide whether corrupt a politician in order to change
the regulation or to bend the rule.
If the firm bends the rule, the game continues to the Third stage - II (see
below, Case II).
If the firm decides to corrupt the politician, the game continues to the Third
stage - I.
Third stage - I
In this stage the politician must decide whether to change the rule or not.
If the rule is not changed, then the firm must decide whether to comply or
to bend the rule. In the latter case, the game continues to the Third stage
- II (see below, Case II). If the firm complies, then the game ends with the
following payoff vector:
pi1 = (rkj − ckj ;wB;wP ). (7)
If the politician changes the rule, then the corrupt transaction can be in-
spected with a probability q. If corruption is detected, the firm suffers of a
punishment m while the politician pays an economic fine λP . Otherwise, we
have undiscovered corruption: the firm pays the cost of political corruption
8
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pNBj – which is the Nash solution of a bargaining game – but obtains the
benefit due to this illegal activity.
The game ends with random payoff vector given by:
piP =

(rkj − (1− α)ckj − pNBj ;wB;wP + P ), with probability 1− q;
(rkj − ckj −m;wB;wP − λP ), with probability q.
(8)
The decision node of the politician leads to a condition to be satisfied by the
quantity P in order to have the change of the rule. Such a condition states
a relationship between some parameters of the model. We will formalize the
assumption on P leading to the changing of the rule by the politician in a
devoted Proposition (see Proposition 3.1), and then consider separately the
two cases coming out from such a condition. In so doing – as we will see –
the Third stage-I leads to the splitting of the game in two different parts.
Case II: condition (5) does not hold
The j-th firm must decide whether bend the rule or comply. If the j-th firm
decides to bend the rule, the game continues at stage three.
Third stage - II
The bureaucrat, who checks the j-th firm, must decide whether to report
the environmental evasion or to ask for a bribe b > 0.
In the case in which the bureaucrat decides to not ask for a bribe, i.e. to
report the bending of rule, the j-th firm must pay a fine m. Then, the game
ends with the following payoff vector:
pi2 = (rkj − ckj −m;wB;wP ). (9)
Otherwise, the game continues to stage four.
Fourth stage - II
If the bureaucrat asks the j-th firm for a bribe bj > 0, then the firm must
decide whether to negotiate such a bribe or refuse the negotiation. When
the bribe is refused by the j-th firm, then the game ends with the following
payoff vector:
pi2 = (rkj − ckj −m;wB;wP ). (10)
If the polluting firm accepts to negotiate the bribe, then the negotiation
starts and the two parties will find an agreement on the the bribe bNBj ,
which corresponds to the Nash solution to a bargaining game. The corrupt
transaction may be inspected with probability q. If corruption is discovered,
then the firm pays a fine m and the bureaucrat a fine λB. Otherwise, we
9
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have undetected corruption.
The game ends with random payoff vector given by:
piB =

(rkj − bNBj ;wB + bNBj ;wP ), with probability 1− q;
(rkj − ckj −m;wB − λB;wP ), with probability q.
(11)
3.2 Time t = 1, . . . T
The game is repeated as in Subsection 3.1. The only remarkable difference
is that political corruption does not appear as a decision node of the game.
Indeed, as already stated in the setting of the model, political corruption is a
permanent corruption, which affects the entire set of the future realizations
of the payoffs. However, the effects of political corruption propagates at
time t > 0, as the terms α’s clearly affirm.
For the convenience of the reader, we write the game in this case.
First stage
The firm decides whether comply or not. In the former case, the payoff
vector is:
pi1 = (rkj − ckj ;wB;wP ). (12)
In the latter case, the firm bends the rule and the game continues to Second
stage .
Second stage
The bureaucrat must decide whether to report the environmental evasion or
to ask for a bribe b > 0. In the no-bribe case, the j-th firm pays a fine m,
and the game ends with the following payoff vector:
pi2 = (rkj − ckj −m;wB;wP ). (13)
Otherwise, the game continues to stage four.
Third stage
If the bureaucrat asks the j-th firm for a bribe b > 0, then the firm decides
to accept or refuse it. In the latter case, the game ends with the following
payoff vector:
pi2 = (rkj − ckj −m;wB;wP ). (14)
Conversely, in the former case, then the negotiation leads to the bribe bNBj ,
which corresponds to the Nash solution to a bargaining game. Also in this
case, q represents the probability of inspection of the corrupt transaction.
The fine in case of corruption detection is m for the firm and λB for the
10
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bureaucrat. Otherwise, we have undetected corruption.
The game ends with random payoff vector given by:
piB =

(rkj − bNB;wB + bNBj ;wP ), with probability 1− q;
(rkj − ckj −m;wB − λB;wP ), with probability q.
(15)
3.3 Solution of the game
The first result states the condition to be satisfied in order to have the
changing of the rule by the politician. This is an anticipation of the extended
solution of the game through backward induction (see Propositions 3.4 and
3.5), and it is reported here for the sake of simplicity.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that condition (5) holds. The regulation is changed
by the politician if and only if
P >
qλP
1− q . (16)
Proof. The politician changes the regulation if and only if
E[pi(P )P ]− pi(P )1 > 0, (17)
where E indicates the expected value operator. By (7) and (8) we have that
condition (17) is equivalent to (16).
In order to proceed to the solution of the game, we now provide an
explicit expression of the bribe bNBj for the bureaucrat and the bribe p
NB
j
for the politician.
Proposition 3.2. For each t = 0, 1, . . . , T and firm j, there is a unique
bribe bNB, as the Nash solution to the bargaining game, given by:
bNBj = (1− β)(ckj +m) +
βqλB
1− q . (18)
where β and 1 − β are the parameters in [0, 1] that can be interpreted as
measures of bargaining strength, of the firm and the bureaucrat, respectively.
Proof. Let us fix t = 0, 1, . . . , T and let φ
∆
(t) =
(
φ
(F )
∆ (t), φ
(B)
∆ (t)
)
be the
vector of the differences in the expected payoffs between the case of agree-
ment and disagreement regarding the bribe between the j-th firm and the
bureaucrat, i.e. 
φ
(F )
∆ (t) = E[pi
(F )
B (t)]− pi(F )2 (t),
φ
(B)
∆ = E[pi
(B)
B (t)]− pi(B)2 (t).
11
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By following the generalized Nash bargaining theory, the bribe of agreement
comes out from:
max
bj∈(0,+∞)
{
φ
(F )
∆ (t)
}β · {φ(B)∆ (t)}1−β , (19)
i.e.:
max
bj∈(0,+∞)
[(1− q)(bj + ckj +m)]β ·
[−qλB + (1− q)bj](1−β) . (20)
The objective function in (24) is a reversed U-shaped function in bj . There-
fore, the first order condition leads to the bribe of agreement:
bNBj = (1− β)(ckj +m) +
βqλB
1− q ,
which is the unique bureaucratic equilibrium bribe in the last subgame.
Since the interesting part of the game is that related to the behavior
of the firm, we here consid r only the payoffs of the firms. The aggregate
expected profits Π at time T of the j-th firm vary, depending on the case,
as follows:
Π =

Πi =
∑T
t=0(rkj − ckj),
Πii =
∑T
t=0
[
q(rkj − ckj −m) + (1− q)(rkj − bNBj )
]
,
Πiii =
∑T
t=0(rkj − ckj −m),
Πiv =
∑T
t=0 [q(rkj − ckj −m) + (1− q)(rkj − (1− α)ckj ]− (1− q)pNBj ,
(21)
where the subscripts point intuitively to the related case in the list presented
at the end of Section 2.
As we saw, the politician ask for a bribe pj which is a Nash solution of a
bargaining game between the firm and the politician.
Proposition 3.3. For each t = 0, 1, . . . , T , there is a unique bribe pNBj , as
the Nash solution to the bargaining game, given by:
pNBj = (T + 1)
[
(1− β)αckj − (1− β)mq(1− q) +
βqλP
(1− q)
]
. (22)
where β and 1 − β are the parameters in [0, 1] that can be interpreted as
measures of bargaining strength of the firm and the politician, respectively.
12
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Proof. Let us fix t = 0, 1, . . . , T and let φ
∆
(t) =
(
φ
(F )
∆ (t), φ
(P )
∆ (t)
)
be the
vector of the differences in the expected payoffs between the case of agree-
ment and disagreement regarding the bribe between the j-th firm and the
politician, i.e. 
φ
(F )
∆ (t) = E[pi
(F )
iv ]− pi(F )i ,
φ
(P )
∆ = E[pi
(P )
iv ]− pi(P )i .
By following the generalized Nash bargaining theory, the bribe of agreement
comes out from:
max
pj∈(0,+∞)
{
φ
(F )
∆ (t)
}β · {φ(P )∆ (t)}1−β , (23)
i.e.:
max
pj∈(0,+∞)
[(1− q)(T + 1)αckj − (T + 1)mq − (1− q)pj)]β·
[−qλP (T + 1) + (1− q)pj](1−β) .
(24)
The objective function in (24) is a reversed U-shaped function in pj . There-
fore, the first order condition leads to the bribe of agreement:
pNBj = (T + 1)
[
(1− β)αckj − (1− β)mq(1− q) +
βqλP
(1− q)
]
.
which is the unique equilibrium political bribe in the last subgame.
By (22), we can rewrite condition (5) for having political corruption as
kj ≥ qm[1− (1− β)(T + 1)] + βqλ
P (T + 1))
r − c[q + (1− α)(1− q) + (1− β)(T + 1)(1− q)α] =: k
(0). (25)
By substituting the value of the bribes bNBj in (18) and p
NB
j in (22) and by
letting explicit the summations, we can rewrite the payoffs in (21) as:
Π =

Πi = (T + 1)(r − c)kj ,
Πii = (T + 1)
{
q(rkj − ckj −m) + (1− q)rkj − (1− q)(1− β)(ckj +m)− βqλB
}
,
Πiii = (T + 1)[(r − c)kj −m],
Πiv = (T + 1)
{
q(rkj − ckj −m)+
+(1− q)[rkj − (1− α)ckj − (1− β)αckj ] + (1− β)mq − βqλP
}
.
(26)
A straightforward computation gives the following results. For greater clar-
ity of the reader, we distinguish the cases of validity or not of (16).
13
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Proposition 3.4. Assume that (16) holds.
There exist seven capital thresholds K(1),K(2),K(3),K(4),K(5),K(6) such
that:
(PC) If kj ∈ (K(1),K(2)) ∪ (K(3),K(4)), then the j-th firm implements po-
litical corruption and the aggregate expected payoff is Πiv.
(BC) If kj ∈ (K(3),K(5)) ∪ (K(6),+∞), then the j-th firm implements bu-
reaucratic corruption, a bribe is agreed and the aggregate expected pay-
off is Πii.
(C) Otherwise, the j-th firm complies and the aggregate expected payoff is
Πi.
Proof. The game is solved using backward induction, which enables the
equilibria to be obtained. The occurring cases will be distinguished.
Case I: condition (25) holds.
The cases of bureaucratic and political corruption leads to two subgames
which will be treated separately. Then, they will be opportunely gathered
together at the initial stages of the decision tree.
Fix a level of time t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
(3B − I) At stage three, the j-th firm negotiates the bribe if and only if
E[pi(F )B ]− pi(F )2 > 0. (27)
Condition (27) is verified when:
kj >
1
c
(
qλB −m(1− q)
1− q
)
=: k(4). (28)
(2B − I) Ascending the decision-making tree, at stage two the bureaucrat de-
cides whether to ask for a bribe or not. The bureaucrat knows that if
she/he asks for a bribe, then the bribe will be negotiated when kj > k4,
and refused otherwise.
(2B − I.1) If kj > k4, then the bureaucrat asks for a bribe if and only if
E[pi(B)B ]− pi(B)2 > 0, (29)
which is always verified.
(2B − I.2) If kj ≤ k4, then the bureaucrat asks for a bribe if and only if
pi
(B)
2 − pi(B)2 > 0, (30)
which is never verified.
14
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(3P − I) At stage three, the politician must decide whether change the regula-
tion or not. The regulation is changed if and only if (16) holds (see
Proposition 3.1).
(2− I) Ascending the decision tree, at stage two the j-th firm must decide
whether to implement political corruption or bend the rule. We need
to distinguish the different cases. The considered payoffs are, naturally,
those at time T .
(2− I.1) If (16) is verified and kj ≥ k(4), then the j-th firm implements
political corruption if and only if
Πiv −Πii > 0, (31)
which leads to
kj < k
(1). (32)
(2− I.2) If (16) is true and kj < k(4), then the j-th firm implements polit-
ical corruption when
Πiv −Πiii > 0, (33)
which leads to
kj > k
(5). (34)
(2− I.3) If (16) does not hold and kj ≥ k(4), then the j-th firm complies
if:
Πi −Πii > 0, (35)
which can be written as:
kj < k
(3). (36)
(2− I.4) If (16) does not hold and kj < k(4), then the j-th firm complies
if:
Πi −Πiii > 0, (37)
which is trivially true.
(1− I) At stage one, the j-th firm must decide whether to comply with reg-
ulation or not. To proceed, we need to observe the cases occurring in
the previous stage.
(1− I.1) If (16) holds, kj ≥ k(4) and kj ≤ k(1), then the j-th firm complies
when:
Πi −Πiv > 0, (38)
which gives
kj < k
(2). (39)
15
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(1− I.2) If (16) holds, kj ≥ k(4) and kj > k(1), then the j-th firm complies
when:
Πi −Πii > 0, (40)
which leads to
kj < k
(3). (41)
(1− I.3) If (16) holds, kj < k(4) and kj > k(5), then the j-th firm complies
when:
Πi −Πiv > 0, (42)
which is then equivalent to:
kj < k
(2). (43)
(1− I.4) If (16) holds, kj < k(4) and kj ≤ k(5), the j-th firm complies if:
Πi −Πiii > 0, (44)
which is trivially true.
(1− I.5) If (16) does not hold, kj ≥ k(4) and kj < k(3), then the j-th
firm complies, in that it implements political corruption and the
politician does not change the rule.
(1− I.6) If (16) is not true, kj ≥ k(4) and kj ≥ k(3), then the j-th firm
complies when:
Πi −Πii > 0, (45)
which is never verified in this case.
(1− I.7) If (16) does not hold and kj < k(4), we are in the same case of
(1− I.5) and the firm complies.
Case II: condition (25) does not hold.
A great part of this analysis is shared with previous case. We collect here
the results for the convenience of the reader.
(3− II) At stage three, the j-th firm negotiates the bribe if and only if kj ≥
k(4).
(2− II) Ascending the decision-making tree, at stage two the bureaucrat de-
cides whether to ask for a bribe or not.
(2− II.1) If kj ≥ k(4), then the bureaucrat asks always for a bribe.
(2− II.2) If kj < k(4), then the bureaucrat never asks for a bribe.
(1− II) At stage one, the j-th firm must decide whether to comply with regu-
lation or bend the rule.
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(1− II.1) If kj ≥ k(4), the firm complies if and only if
Πi −Πii > 0. (46)
Condition (46) is verified when:
kj < k
(3). (47)
(1− II.2) If kj < k(4), the firm complies when
Πi −Πiii > 0. (48)
which is always verified.
Now, it is sufficient to set the values of the thresholds to:
K(1) = k(1),
K(2) = max{k(0), k(2), k(4)},
K(3) = k(4),
K(4) = max{k(0), k(2), k(5)},
K(5) = max{k(0), k(3)},
K(6) = max{k(0), k(1), k(3), k(4)}.
(49)
If the condition (16) does not hold, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3.5. Assume that (16) does not hold and consider the threshold
K(2) defined in Proposition 3.4. Then:
(BC) If kj ≥ K(2), then the j-th firm implements bureaucratic corruption, a
bribe is agreed and the aggregate expected payoff is Πii.
(C) Otherwise, the j-th firm complies and the aggregate expected payoff is
Πi.
The proof is similar to – and simpler than – the previous one. It is
omitted.
Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 show the existence of some capital and probability
thresholds beyond which the perfect Nash equilibria in the sub-games are
obtained. As already illustrated above, the payoffs describe three different
situations:
17
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• Πi is the honest behavior, in which the firm complies.
• Πii is the payoff for bureaucratic corruption, when a bribe is agreed
upon by the firm and the bureaucrat.
• Πiv is the payoff for the political corruption when the lobbying activity
takes place, and the politician changes the regulation.
The results show that, in line with the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture, the size of the firm, i.e. its capital level, is a necessary condition for
political corruption. But, differently from previous literature, such a thresh-
old value (k(0)) is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the firm to
find it worthwhile to engage in political corruption. In fact, having satisfied
the necessary condition, firms find it worthwhile to move from political cor-
ruption to bureaucratic corruption as the size of the firm grows. The reason
is that the payoff for bureaucratic corruption decreases less than that for
political corruption when capital level increases. This happens because, in
our model, the effectiveness of political corruption is more questionable than
that of bureaucratic corruption, as the term α < 1 states.
4 Aggregation of capital
This section aims at providing some insights on the relationship between
political corruption, bureaucratic corruption and the industrial structure of
the Country in which firms are placed.
We assume that the firms have a Gamma law distribution, based on capital
levels. The decision to employ a Gamma distribution is a consequence of
the capacity of this probability law to capture different situations. Indeed,
Gamma depends on two nonnegative parameters h and θ, respectively rep-
resenting the shape and the scale. The variation of h and θ drives the shape
of the density function of a Gamma distribution.
Given h, θ > 0, we then denote X ∼ Γ(h, θ), and the probability density
function is
f(x) =
xh−1 exp{−x/θ}
Γ(θ, h)
, x > 0, (50)
where Γ(θ, h) is a normalizing constant. We here perform some numerical
experiments to assess the relevance of compliance behavior, bureaucratic
corruption and political corruption, as coming out from Proposition 3.4.
To capture different cases of industrial districts, we consider four cases:
h = 1, θ = 5; h = 5, θ = 2; h = 10, θ = 3; h = 15, θ = 5. The graphs
of the density functions are found in Figures 1-4, respectively. The first
case represents a Country with mostly small firms, while the second one,
represents a country with mostly big companies. Intermediate cases are
associated to a more balanced proportion between large and small firms,
18
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Figure 1: Density function of a Gamma distribution: h = 1, θ = 5
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Figure 2: Density function of a Gamma distribution: h = 5, θ = 2
with more small firms in case 2 and more large ones in case 3. The
dataset used is: r = 100, c = 30,m = 30, λB = 30, T = 4. Following
Escobari (2012), we fix a fine for the firm m = 30, which implies a 100%
fine over unpaid tax liabilities. For what regards the tax compliance, i .e. c,
following Sanjiet and al-Nowaihi (2007), we set a tax rate of 30% (c = 30).
We let α, β and q vary: α = 0.2; 0.8 (high level of Government insta-
19
Page 23 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/imaman
Manuscripts submitted to IMA Journal of Management Mathematics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
0 50 100 150 200
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
Figure 3: Density function of a Gamma distribution: h = 10, θ = 3
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Figure 4: Density function of a Gamma distribution: h = 15, θ = 5
bility, high level of Government stability, respectively), q = 0.2; 0.8 (low
and high monitoring activity, respectively), β = 0.15; 0.85 (asymmetric bar-
gaining strength between bureaucrat/politician and firm, in favor of bureau-
crat/politician and firm, respectively). The truncation of the capitals, when
needed in the numerical computation of the integrals (see below), is reason-
ably performed at K = 1000.
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Thus, the aggregation of the capital levels divides the space is three regions:
PC +BC + C = 1, (51)
where PC,BC,C stand for political corruption, bureaucratic corruption and
compliance, and are associated to the equilibria Πiv, Πii and Πi respectively.
The terms of (51) can be explicitly written as follows:
BC = 1Γ(θ,h)
∫
IBC x
h−1 exp{−x/θ}dx
PC = 1Γ(θ,h)
∫
ISC x
h−1 exp{−x/θ}dx
C = 1−BC − PC,
(52)
where:
• If condition (16) holds:

IBC = (K(3),K(5)) ∪ (K(6),+∞);
IPC = (K(1),K(2)) ∪ (K(3),K(4)).
• If condition (16) does not hold:

IBC = (K(2),+∞);
IPC = ∅.
In order to be more insightful with the analysis of the results, we employ
the definition of the thresholds K’s in (49) and report a discussion of the
values k’s.
Figure 5 provides a quick look of how the game solution varies with the
parametrizations. The only case of validity of Condition 16 is reported,
being the other case simple.
5 Discussion of the results
Table 5 contains the values of the thresholds k’s as the parameters change.
In order to make the results clearer, let us rename the thresholds found for
the capital critical level:
• k(0). We call this threshold the Necessary Political Corruption Thresh-
old (NPCT) because this is the necessary capital level for a firm to
engage political corruption: if the firm’s capital level kj is less than
k(0), the j-th firm do not have the necessary capital to engage in po-
litical corruption; if the firm’s capital level kj is greater than k(0), the
j-th firm can engage in political corruption;
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Par 1
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C BC
C SC BC
k(2) k(1)
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Figure 5: Scheme of the relevant thresholds for the case of validity of Con-
dition 16 and in the eight cases Par’s. C, PC and BC stand for compliance,
political corruption and bureaucratic corruption, respectively.
• k(1). We call this threshold the Political vs Bureaucratic Corruption
Threshold (BPT) because if the firm’s capital level kj is less than k(1),
the j-th firm will find it worthwhile to engage in political corruption;
if the firm’s capital level kj is greater than k(1), the j-th firm will find
it worthwhile to engage in bureaucratic corruption;
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Table 1: Values of the thresholds in different cases. The values of the
parameters which are relevant in the solution of the game are expressed
in bold (see Proposition 3.4 and Figure 5).
Label Parameters k(0) k(1) k(2) k(3) k(4) k(5)
Par1 α = 0.2, q = 0.2, β = 0.85 0.38 0.27 2.5 0.72 -0.75 -4.85
Par2 α = 0.8, q = 0.2, β = 0.85 0.36 1.10 0.63 0.72 -0.75 -1.21
Par3 α = 0.2, q = 0.8, β = 0.85 1.54 1.10 40.00 8.88 3.00 10.59
Par4 α = 0.8, q = 0.8, β = 0.85 1.52 4.41 10.00 8.88 3.00 2.65
Par5 α = 0.2, q = 0.2, β = 0.15 -0.28 8.85 2.50 7.58 -0.75 -39.17
Par6 α = 0.8, q = 0.2, β = 0.15 -1.97 35.42 0.63 7.58 -0.75 -9.79
Par7 α = 0.2, q = 0.8, β = 0.15 -0.91 35.42 40.00 36.33 3.00 -126.67
Par8 α = 0.8, q = 0.8, β = 0.15 -1.10 141.67 10.00 36.33 3.00 -31.67
• k(2). We call this threshold the Political Corruption vs Compliance
Threshold (PCT) because if the firm’s capital level kj is less than k(2),
the j-th firm will find it worthwhile to comply with the rule; if the
firm’s capital level kj is greater than k(2), the j-th firm will find it
worthwhile to engage in political corruption;
• k(3). We call this threshold the Bureaucratic Corruption vs Compli-
ance Threshold (BCT) because if the firm’s capital level kj is less than
k(3), the j-th firm will find it worthwhile to comply with the rule; if
the firm’s capital level kj is greater than k(3), the j-th firm will find it
worthwhile to engage in bureaucratic corruption.
By looking at Table 5, Par1-Par4 represent cases with β = 0.85, i.e.
higher bargaining power of the firm versus both the bureaucrat and politi-
cian. Therefore, in such cases, ceteris paribus, the firm will have a high
incentive not to comply with regulations and engage in political or bureau-
cratic corruption. Conversely, when β = 0.15, the bargaining strength of
the firm is low and therefore, the firm has a low incentive, ceteris paribus,
not to comply. It is worth to observe that when the bargaining strength of
the firms is low, i.e. Par5-Par8, then the low–level of political bribe leads
to k(0) < 0. In these cases, the entire set of firms is able to perform political
corruption, since it is economically very sustainable.
As for the monitoring level q, a high level of control (q = 0.8 in our model)
implies that it is less convenient for the firm, ceteris paribus, not to comply;
the opposite is true for low levels of monitoring.
As already said, the parameter α represents the long-term effectiveness of
political corruption. Hence, ceteris paribus, a high level of α (α = 0.8, in our
model) implies that the firm will find it worthwhile to put in place political
corruption rather than bureaucratic one and viceversa, for low levels of α.
In the cases Par1, Par3, Par4 and Par7, we have only one relevant capital
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level k(3): if the j-th capital level is less than k(3), then the j-th firm will
find it worthwhile to comply and viceversa if kj is greater than k(3). This
happens because there is a low incentive to engage in political corruption: in
fact, the threshold value k(2) is lower than the threshold value k(1). In this
case the incentive of political corruption disappears since the effectiveness
of political corruption is low (α = 0.2 for Par1, Par3, and Par7) or is high
but in the presence of a high control (q = 008 for Par4).
By analyzing Proposition 3.4 and comparing its result with the numerical
values of Table 1, it is evident that k1 > k(2) is the only condition leading to
political corruption equilibrium. In this case, we obtain a compliance equi-
librium for low capital level (kj < k(2)), a political corruption equilibrium
for intermediate capital level (k2 < kj < k(1)) and a bureaucratic corruption
equilibrium for high capital level (kj > k(1)).
As for the compliant behavior, it is worth noticing that the ”compliance
capital range” is wide when the monitoring level is high: in fact, Par7
(compliance for kj < k(3) = 36.33), Par8 (compliance for kj < k(2) = 10)
and Par3 and Par4 (compliance for kj < k(3) = 8.88) present the largest
”compliance capital range”. The ”compliance capital range” is lowest when
the level of monitoring is low (q = 0.2) and the effectiveness of political
corruption is high (Par2 and Par6).
The bureaucratic corruption, ceteris paribus, is high when the bargaining
power of the firm is high, the monitoring level is low, and the political cor-
ruption is unattractive (α = 0.2). Viceversa, the political corruption, ceteris
paribus, is more attractive with respect to bureaucratic corruption when the
effectiveness of political corruption is high (α = 0.8). In the light of the
above, it is clear why the cases with the greater ”political corruption capital
range” are Par6 and Par8, while the cases with the greater ”bureaucratic
corruption capital range” are Par1, Par2, Par5, and Par3 and Par4.
Differently from Harstad and Svensonn (2011), we have taken into account
differences in capital levels. This allow us to take into account different
industrial structures. Specifically, the quantities in (52) are computed for
the entire set of cases present in Table 5, and for the four cases of Gamma
distributions mentioned above: h = 1, θ = 5; h = 5, θ = 2; h = 10, θ = 3;
h = 15, θ = 5. In Tables 5 and 5, the results are presented for cases in which
condition (16) is valid or not.
As fore Table 5, note that, in all the examined cases, at least one of the
regions seems to have a prominent role in respect to the others.
As already argued above, ceteris paribus, the industrial structures with a
significant number of small firms (i.e. h = 1, θ = 5) show higher compliance
in the case of low firm capital level. Political corruption, instead, is higher
in the case of intermediate firm capital levels, while bureaucratic corruption
is higher in the case of high capital levels. By reading Table 5 from left
to right, i.e. from structures with many small firms to those with a high
number of large firms, we observe a decrease in compliance and an increase in
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Table 2: Values of PC,BC,C in the different cases. Condition (16) holds.
Label Region h = 1, θ = 5 h = 5, θ = 2 h = 10, θ = 3 h = 15, θ = 5
PC 0 0 0 0
Par1 BC 0.8623 0.9999 1 1
C 0.1377 0.0001 0 0
PC 0.0805 0.0002 0 0
Par2 BC 0.7988 0.9997 1 1
C 0.1207 0.0001 0 0
PC 0 0 0 0
Par3 BC 0.1685 0.5438 1 1
C 0.8315 0.4562 0 0
PC 0 0 0 0
Par4 BC 0.1685 0.5438 1 1
C 0.8315 0.4562 0 0
PC 0.4348 0.4450 0.0009 0
Par5 BC 0.1695 0.5465 0.9991 1
C 0.3957 0.0085 0.031 0
PC 0.8781 1 0.7403 0.0070
Par6 BC 0.0008 0 0.2597 0.9930
C 0.1211 0 0 0
PC 0 0 0 0
Par7 BC 0.0007 0.0001 0.2329 0.9921
C 0.9993 0.9999 0.7671 0.0079
PC 0.1348 0.4409 0.9977 0.9977
Par8 BC 0 0 0 0
C 0.8652 0.5591 0.0023 0.0023
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Table 3: Values of PC,BC,C in the different cases. Condition (16) does
not hold.
Label Region h = 1, θ = 5 h = 5, θ = 2 h = 10, θ = 3 h = 15, θ = 5
PC - - - -
Par1 BC 0.8623 1 1 1
C 0.1377 0 0 0
PC - - - -
Par2 BC 0.8623 1 1 1
C 0.1377 0 0 0
PC - - - -
Par3 BC 0.1685 0.5438 0.9990 1
C 0.8315 0.4562 0.0010 0
PC - - - -
Par4 BC 0.1685 0.5438 0.9990 1
C 0.8315 0.4562 0.0010 0
PC - - - -
Par5 BC 0.2185 0.6699 0.9996 1
C 0.7815 0.3301 0.0004 0
PC - - - -
Par6 BC 0.2185 0.6699 0.9996 1
C 0.7815 0.3301 0.0004 0
PC - - - -
Par7 BC 0.0007 0.0001 0.2329 0.9921
C 0.9993 0.9999 0.7671 0.0079
PC - - - -
Par8 BC 0.0007 0.0001 0.2329 0.9921
C 0.9993 0.9999 0.7671 0.0079
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bureaucratic corruption, which definitively prevails on political corruption.
Industrial structures with a high number of medium-sized firms (i.e. h =
5, θ = 2 and h = 10, θ = 3) show political corruption levels higher than other
industrial structures. Bureaucratic corruption appears to be the dominant
behavior in the industrial structure which has a majority of large firms (i.e.
h = 15, θ = 5).
The findings discussed for Table 5 seems to be confirmed when firms cannot
implement political corruption (Table 5). Also in this case, an industrial
structure composed by a majority of large firms (h = 15, θ = 5) leads to
the predominance of bureaucratic corruption. Moreover, the case in which
small firms are prevalent (h = 1, θ = 5) is associated with a more compliant
behavior, mainly in presence of a low level of bargaining (β = 0.15) and a
high level of monitoring activity (q = 0.8).
To conclude, a less detailed panoramic view of Tables 5 and 5 forcefully
evidences the relevant role played by the industrial structure on the behavior
(compliance or corruption) of the firms.
6 Conclusions
This paper explores the nature of political and bureaucratic corruption as
alternative or coexistent choices in the same industrial environment. The
probability of a punishment plays a relevant role in fighting corruption. Its
value divides firms among those performing political corruption and the ones
bribing bureaucrats. In addition, the results evidence the relevance of the
effectiveness of political corruption. The results show that the size of the
firm, i.e. its capital level, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for firms
to engage in political corruption. This because, once the necessary condi-
tion is satisfied, firms find it worthwhile to move from political corruption
to bureaucratic one as the size of the firm grows. This because we have con-
sidered that the results of political corruption are more uncertain than the
results of bureaucratic corruption. Specifically, the corrupt politician can
not grant the ”favorable” rule, due to changes in government, reinstatement
of the old rules, etc. Conversely, bureaucratic corruption, since it is engage
in each specific period, is less random in the results.
Because compliant behavior is more convenient, ceteris paribus, for firms
with a low capital levels, industrial structures with a significant number
of small firms show a higher compliance. Industrial structures with a high
number of medium-sized firms show levels of political corruption higher than
other industrial structures. Bureaucratic corruption appears to be the dom-
inant behavior in industrial structures which a majority of large firms.
27
Page 31 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/imaman
Manuscripts submitted to IMA Journal of Management Mathematics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
References
[1] Anthropelos, M., Frangos, N.E., Xanthopoulos, S.Z., Yannacopoulos,
A.N., 2014. Contract pricing and utility sharing. IMA Journal of Man-
agement Mathematics, 25(3), 329-352.
[2] Campos, N., and Giovannoni F., 2007. Lobbying, Corruption and Polit-
ical Influence. Public Choice, 131(1), 1-21.
[3] Celentani, M., Ganuza, J.-J., 2002. Organized vs. competitive corrup-
tion. Annals of Operations Research, 109, 293-315.
[4] Cerqueti, R., Coppier, R., 2009. Tax revenues, fiscal corruption and
”shame” costs’. Economic Modelling, 26(6), 1239-1244.
[5] Cerqueti, R., Coppier, R., 2011. Economic growth, corruption and tax
evasion. Economic Modelling, 28(1-2), 489-500.
[6] Cerqueti, R., Coppier, R., 2013. Corruptibility and tax evasion. European
Journal of Law and Economics, 39(2), 355-373.
[7] Cerqueti, R., Coppier, R., 2014a. A game theoretical analysis of the im-
pact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption. Annals
of Operations Research, doi:10.1007/s10479-014-1567-9.
[8] Cerqueti, R., Coppier, R., 2014b. Corruption, Evasion and Environmen-
tal Policy: a Game Theory Approach. IMA Journal of Management Math-
ematics, doi:10.1093/imaman/dpu019.
[9] Cerqueti, R., Coppier, R., Piga, G., 2012. Corruption, growth and eth-
nolinguistic fractionalization: a theoretical game model. Journal of Eco-
nomics, 106, 153-181.
[10] Chander, P., Wilde, L., 1992. Corruption in tax administration. Journal
of Public Economics, 49, 333-349.
[11] Damania, R., Fredricksson P. G., and Mani M., 2004. The Persistence of
Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence.
Public Choice, 121, 36390.
[12] Escobari, D., 2012. Imperfect Detection of Tax Evasion in a Corrupt
Tax Administration. Public Organization Review, 12(4), 317-330.
[13] Fredriksson, P. G. and Wollscheid, J.R., 2008. The Political Economy of
Investment: The Case of Pollution Control Technology. European Journal
of Political Economy, 24(1), 53–72.
28
Page 32 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/imaman
Manuscripts submitted to IMA Journal of Management Mathematics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
[14] Harstad, B. and J. Svensson, 2011. Bribes, Lobbying and Development.
American Political Science Review, 105(1), 46–63.
[15] Hellman, J. and Kaufmann D., 2001. Confronting the Challenge of State
Capture in Transition Economies. Finance & Development, IMF 38(3).
[16] Hindriks, J., Keen, M., Muthoo, A., 1999. Corruption, extortion and
evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 74, 394-430.
[17] Kaufmann D., 2009. Corruption And The Global Financial Crisis.
http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisis-business-
corruption09 0127corruption.html
[18] Macrae, J., 1982. Underdevelopment and the economics of corruption:
a game theory approach. World Development, 10(8), 677-687.
[19] Majumdar, M., Yoo, S.H., 2012. Strategic analysis of influence ped-
dling. International Journal of Game Theory, 41(4), 737-762.
[20] Mesterton-Gibbons, M., 2000. An introduction to game-theoretic mod-
elling. American Mathematical Society, Rhode Island.
[21] Moulin, H., 1986. Game theory for the social sciences. Second and Re-
vised Edition, New York: New York University Press.
[22] Pasetta, V., 1999. Dynamics in divide the money game with bribing.
Annals of Operations Research, 88, 361-377.
[23] Sanjit D. and Ali al-Nowaihi, 2007. Why do people pay taxes? Prospect
theory versus expected utility theory. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 64, 171-192.
[24] Sanyal, A., Gang, I.N., Gosswami, O., 2000. Corruption, tax evasion
and the Laffer Curve. Public Choice, 105, 61-78.
29
Page 33 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/imaman
Manuscripts submitted to IMA Journal of Management Mathematics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
  
 
 
Figure 5  
214x326mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
 
 
Page 34 of 34
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/imaman
Manuscripts submitted to IMA Journal of Management Mathematics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
